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Abstract
Recent research on the dynamics between attentional and memory processes have outlined the idea that applying control in a
conflicting situation directly leads to enhanced episodic memory of the processed information. However, in spite of a small subset
of studies supporting this claim, the majority of the evidence in the field seems to support the opposite pattern. In this study, we
used a face–word Stroop task to enforce different control modes either from trial to trial or in an item-specific manner. Both
manipulations of congruency proved to be effective in making participants’ responses to conflicting stimuli more efficient over
time by applying a trial-specific control mode. However, these manipulations had no impact on memory performance on a
surprise recognition memory test. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt at measuring the memory consequences of the
application of specific control modes at the trial level. The results reported here call for caution and possibly reconceptualization
of the relationship between cognitive control and memory.
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Pursuing unusual goals (e.g., throwing a new sequence of
punches when boxing or including new moves in your tango
sequence) is more demanding than performing comparatively
more habitual goals (e.g., sticking to your old moves in both
scenarios) because to reach infrequent goals, performers have
to take every step required to accomplish such goals and also
prevent the potential intrusion coming from more habitual
actions performed in those contexts. The processes recruited
to overcome the conflict between alternative action courses
are collectively referred to as “cognitive control,” and they
have been explored systematically by means of interference
lab tasks such as Stroop (MacLeod, 1992; Stroop, 1935),
flanker (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), or Simon (Simon &
Berbaum, 1990) tasks. For instance, in a Stroop task, if a
participant is told to respond to a word denoting a color by
referring to the color in which it is printed, its semantic content
leads to an interference that is measured as the difference in
reaction times between the conditions in which both features
are congruent or incongruent with each other.
One important result from the literature on cognitive con-
trol is that the efficiency of control processes is not invariant,
but is rather subject to systematic changes. Thus, the effect of
congruency decreases immediately after responding to an in-
congruent trial (i.e., the congruency sequence effect, or CSE;
Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992), or after responding to a
large proportion of incongruent trials over a given block (i.e.,
list-wide proportion congruency effect, or LWPCE; Logan &
Zbrodoff, 1979), a specific context (context-specific propor-
tion congruency effect, or CSPCE; Crump, Gong, &Milliken,
2006), or even for a specific item (item-specific proportion
congruency effect, or ISPCE; Jacoby, Lindsay, & Hessels,
2003). Thus, it appears that the efficiency of cognitive control
becomes finely attuned to the previous experience, and it im-
proves precisely in those conditions in which it becomes
challenged.
Learning and the dynamics of cognitive
control
One of the most prominent attempts to account for the control
dynamics outlined above came from the conflict monitoring
theory (CMT) proposed by Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter,
and Cohen (2001). The CMT suggests that conflict signals
generated on an incongruent trial trigger a temporal up-
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regulation of cognitive control that improves its focus on the
target immediately after having encountered that conflicting
trial. Adaptation to conflict can explain both CSE and
LWPCE, assuming that the increase of control produced im-
mediately after a conflict trial does not decline completely
after a single trial, but tends to produce gradual and cumula-
tive effects, modulating control over extended periods of train-
ing. However, the model has more problems dealing with
control effects that appeared linked to specific contexts or
specific types of trial. Temporal modulations such as those
proposed by the CMTare not well suited to account for chang-
es associated to specific features, which instead call for the
acquisition of enduring associations between those features
and the specific parameters of control that are requested under
these circumstances (Blais, Robidoux, Risko, & Besner, 2007;
Verguts & Notebaert, 2008).
One prediction that follows from the link between associa-
tive learning and cognitive control is that the increased control
triggered by any experience of conflict should result not only
in more efficient responses but also in an enhanced encoding
of the relevant episodes. Specifically, if the original CMT
claims that the adaptation process takes place across succes-
sive trials (Botvinick et al., 2001), such improvements in con-
trol could be expected to lead to an enhanced encoding of the
episodes that come right after an incongruent trial, rather than
of the event that generated the conflict. However, other inter-
pretations have suggested that a full readjustment of control
could take place within a single trial, thus supporting the pre-
diction of an enhanced encoding of the conflicting episodes
(Scherbaum, Fischer, Dshemuchadse, & Goschke, 2011).
Other authors have claimed that the experience of conflict acts
as a trigger for arousal responses, which improve the efficien-
cy of associative learning and hence promote adaptation as a
consequence of learning, rather than the other way around
(Verguts & Notebaert, 2008). In any of these cases, regardless
of whether associative learning plays an antecedent or conse-
quent role in its dynamic relation with cognitive control, all
these accounts predict a close relationship between control
and memory.
Control as memory
A few other theoretical accounts have attempted to explain
this learning-adaptation dynamic by adopting a full-fledged
episodic standpoint, thus conceiving the observed modula-
tions of control as the effects of priming, derived from the
reinstatement of the features of a previous trial, or of the rep-
etition of the whole cognitive set that recurs after having ex-
perienced the same settings on an immediately previous trial.
Thus, rather than assuming that conflict leads to control and
thus to increased learning (Botvinick et al., 2001), or that
conflict leads to learning, and hence to improved control
(Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 2009), the episodic accounts
claim that all cognitive processes are primed by the reinstate-
ment of the contexts in which they were implemented, and
thus that fluctuations in performance reflect different
instantiations of that rule. This episodic view was originally
proposed byMayr, Awh, and Laurey (2003) to account for the
CSE as a result of repetition priming, and by Hommel,
Proctor, and Vu (2004) to understand this phenomenon in
terms of previous experience with particular feature bindings.
A more global instantiation of the same idea was put forward
more recently by Egner (2014), assuming that the control ad-
justments triggered in a particular context become incorporat-
ed into the episodic event files, thus binding the internal cog-
nitive state and the attentional settings applied to that context
together with the features of that episode; this binding makes it
easier to apply the same settings in exactly the same ways
when that particular stimulus configuration recurs. In any
case, the question remains open with respect to whether such
generalized binding processes can support exclusively an im-
provement in response to a close replication of the same task
or whether it could also improve memory for the identity of
the target.
Conflict enhanced memory
The hypothesis of conflict-enhanced memory has been recent-
ly examined through several studies using different paradigms
(Krebs, Boehler, De Belder, & Egner, 2015; Ortiz-Tudela,
Milliken, Botta, LaPointe, & Lupiañez, 2016; Ortiz-Tudela,
Milliken, Jiménez, & Lupiáñez, 2018; Rosner, D’Angelo,
MacLellan, & Milliken, 2015a). For instance, Krebs et al.
(2015) used a face–word Stroop task, in which participants
were asked to respond to the gender of a given set of faces
that were overlaid with a distracting word (i.e., “MAN” or
“WOMAN”). These words rendered Stroop-like congruency
effects, as the gender of the face could match or mismatch the
meaning of the word; accordingly, the authors measured faster
responses when the word accurately indicated the gender of
the target face. More important for the current purposes, the
authors also reported that when participants were later asked
to perform a recognition memory test on the target faces, they
produced a larger proportion of high-confident recognition
responses to those faces that were paired with an incongruent
distracter.
Rosner and colleagues reported a similar result (Davis,
Rosner, D’Angelo, MacLellan, & Milliken, 2019; Rosner
et al., 2015a; Rosner, Davis, & Milliken, 2015b) using a
naming task, in which participants were presented with pairs
of spatially interleaved words written in two different colors
and were told to read aloud the word written in one of the
colors. Participants were faster when both words were
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identical, but they were more able to recognize those target
words that had been presented with an incongruent distracter.
At variance with these previous results, Ortiz-Tudela et al.
(2018) tested up to seven variations of a spatial cueing para-
digm in which participants were told either to read aloud or to
categorize a long series of words preceded by a visual cue that
generated a spatial expectation about the target location. Even
though these experiments succeeded in generating and break-
ing spatial expectations, as judged by the congruency effects
obtained in participants’ reaction times (RTs), the authors
found no evidence consistent with the hypothesis that a mis-
match of such spatial expectations could be enough to trigger
any enhancement in memory.
The present study
The main goal of this study was to further investigate the
hypothesis that conflict enhances memory, going back to the
original paradigm devised byKrebs et al. (2015), in an attempt
to reproduce and extend the evidence gathered in that study.
Because it is not clear whether the memory enhancement trig-
gered by an upsurge of control should take place within a
single trial (Scherbaum et al., 2011) or would be better
expressed on the trial that immediately follows a conflicting
trial, as originally proposed by the CMT (Botvinick et al.,
2001), in Experiment 1, we conceptually replicated the origi-
nal experiment, but assessed the effects of responding to a
conflict trial (n) both on the recognition of the face presented
on that trial (n) and on the face presented on the successive
trial (n + 1), as compared with recognition of the face that
immediately preceded the conflict trial(n − 1). To foreshadow
the results, this experiment produced no evidence consistent
with the hypothesis that conflict produced a generalized en-
hancement of memory, neither for the conflicting trial, nor for
the trial that immediately followed that conflict, even though it
suggested that memory may be selectively enhanced for those
conflicting trials that come right after another conflict trial.
In Experiment 2, we modified the procedure in an attempt
to strengthen any boost in encoding directly triggered by cog-
nitive conflict. We reasoned that if enhanced encoding was
indeed triggered by conflict, but in a very mild way, maybe
a single presentation of a given face in incongruent conditions
was not enough to produce a significant modulation of mem-
ory; we therefore aimed at increasing any potential effects by
repeating the presentation of certain faces under conditions of
high or low proportion of congruency. As described above, the
ISPCE has been documented in several procedures (Bugg,
Jacoby, & Chanani, 2011; Jacoby et al., 2003), indicating that
participants can learn to associate particular control settings to
specific stimuli when they are consistently presented in con-
ditions of high versus low conflict. Applying this reasoning to
the face–word Stroop task, we expected that a repeated
exposure of particular faces in conditions of high versus low
conflict could lead to (1) an adaptive modulation of control, as
measured by the ISPCE, and (2) larger differences in memory
performance between congruent and incongruent faces when
those were presented in conditions of high versus low propor-
tion of congruency.
Experiment 1
The extent to which conflict-driven memory enhancements
are restricted in time to the boost in encoding of the conflicting
information or whether they could also affect information pre-
sented following the conflict is still unsolved. Accordingly,
one prominent theory that explains CSE states that the detec-
tion of conflict between coactive representations triggers en-
hanced processing not only of the current event but also of
subsequent stimuli (Gratton et al., 1992). In this experiment,
we intended to test whether the up-regulation of cognitive
control observed for n-lagged trials produces recognition
memory benefits for the items in said trials. We used a face–
word Stroop paradigm in which we measured congruency
effects in recognition memory both for trial n and trial n + 1.
Method
Participants
The original effect found by Krebs e al. (2015) was observed
on a sample of 20 participants. An a priori power analysis
based on the result of their matched-samples t test (t = 2.29)
indicated that the size of the difference between the recogni-
tion of congruent and incongruent faces amounted to a
Cohen’s d of .51, an effect size that the original sample of
20 participants would be able to catch with a power (1 − β)
of only.71. To increase that power to the recommendable cri-
terion of .80, we needed a sample of 28 participants. However,
in order to increase that power to a target level of .90, we
aimed at recruiting valid data from a total of 36 participants.
We recruited 37 students from the Universidad de Santiago de
Compostela to take part in the study. They signed informed
consents and took part in the experiment in exchange for
course credit. The study was part of a larger project that was
approved by the local Ethical Committee of the University of
Santiago de Compostela. One participant was removed from
the sample because he or she did not understand the face
gender task and simply watched the faces without responding
to this task.
Stimuli
The face stimuli were selected from the same database used by
Krebs et al. (2015), the Glasgow Unfamiliar Face Database
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(Burton, White, & McNeill, 2010), that includes 304 stimuli
corresponding to male and female faces, cropped to preserve
exclusively the contour of the heads. From the overall sample,
we performed an initial selection to exclude those that ap-
peared especially distinctive, and selected a subset of 180
faces (90 male and 90 female) to be included in the study. In
the familiarization and memory test phases, each face was
presented alone, over a white background, with dimensions
of approximately 5 × 7 cm (note that these dimensions varied
slightly among different pictures, because their size is not
completely uniform). In the face–word Stroop task, each face
was overlaid with a congruent or an incongruent word (the
Spanish words for MAN or WOMAN) written in black, Arial
bold 24-point capitalized font (3.4 × 0.8 cm), located approx-
imately over the nose area (see Fig. 1).
Procedure
To conceptually replicate the procedure of Krebs et al. (2015),
participants were first presented with a familiarization task,
followed by the face–word Stroop task, and a surprise mem-
ory test, which was administered after a distracter task in
which participants were asked to perform an unrelated task
for a period of approximately 15 min.1
Familiarization In the familiarization task, participants had
the first opportunity to view the faces that were going to
appear later in the Stroop task. This was included in the
experiment by Krebs et al. (2015) under the argument that
responding to completely novel stimuli can reduce the in-
terference caused by the irrelevant words, and to avoid
floor effects in the memory test. Participants were asked
to pay attention to the faces, and to indicate whether each
face had been seen previously or not. In the present version
of the task, participants used the computer mouse to click
on four possible buttons represented as pictures at the bot-
tom of the screen, that contained the legends “sure not,”
“believe not,” “believe yes,” and “sure yes” to represent
their response to the question of whether that particular
face had been presented earlier or not. For each participant,
the program randomly chose 72 out of the 90 pictures of
male faces, and another 72 out of the 90 pictures of female
faces, for a total of 144 faces, which were presented twice
at random. Thus, an already-presented face could appear at
every moment in the task, and participants were free to
inspect the faces for as long as they wished before deciding
on a response. The following trial appeared immediately
after having responded to the previous trial, and the task
continued up to the end of the 288 trials.
Face–word Stroop taskAfter the familiarization task, the full set
of 144 familiarized trials were presented once again in the context
of a face–word Stroop task. Each of these Stroop trials was
preceded by a fixation point presented for 1000 ms, centered
on the position in which the irrelevant word would appear over-
laid on the face. Both face and word appeared later for another
period of 1000 ms, and participants were told to indicate the
gender of the face regardless of the meaning of the word, using
the keys “Z” and “M” from a standard QWERTY keyboard. The
specific mapping between gender and responses was
counterbalanced across participants, and the particular mapping
used for each participant was reminded to them by using two
horizontal color bars (blue and pink) presented at the bottom of
the screen at the relative locations corresponding respectively to
male and female categories. Upon pressing a response key, the
inner part of the bar corresponding to the chosen response turned
grey, to provide an immediate feedback of the performed re-
sponse. If an error was committed, or if no response was emitted
before the end of the 1000 ms exposure time, a warning error
sound was emitted. Critically, the word superimposed on each
face could be either congruent with the face gender (i.e., theword
WOMAN on a female face) or incongruent with it (the word
MAN over a female face), and the overall proportion of congru-
ency was 50%.
Familiarization RecognitionFace-word Stroop
1000 ms 1000 ms
z m
z m
Fig. 1 Schematic representation of Experiment 1 showing, from left to right, a trial from the familiarization task, the temporal arrangement of a trial from
the face–word Stroop task, and a trial from the recognition task
1 In the original study, participants performed an fMRI task and other tasks
unrelated to the study for about an hour. We presented them with a pilot study
involving a serial-reaction-time task, in which participants were required to use
four keys from the keyboard to respond to the location of a stimulus that
moved over a series of four possible locations, following a probabilistic se-
quence. Participants performed six blocks of 96 trials with this task.
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Recognition memory testAfter a delay of approximately 15
min, which was filled with an unrelated serial-reaction-
time task, participants were presented with a surprise rec-
ognition memory test. On each of these trials, participants
saw a face and were asked to judge whether it had been
presented before or not, using the same categories
employed during the familiarization task (i.e., “sure
not,” “believe not,” “believe yes,” “sure yes”). The faces
selected for the recognition task included 36 completely
new faces (from here on, NEW) and four different types of
faces already seeing in the face–word Stroop task. These
old faces were automatically selected by the program to
include all the incongruent faces that occurred after a se-
ries of at least two congruent trials (from here on, CON-
INC), the congruent faces that immediately preceded each
of these selected incongruent trials (and that therefore oc-
curred after another congruent trial, CON-CON), and
those faces that followed the referred incongruent trials,
which were fur the r subd iv ided as incongruen t
postincongruent (from here on, INC-INC) and congruent
postincongruent (from here on, INC-CON; see Fig. 2 for
visual depiction of the trial coding).
The number of trials contained in each category
depended on the particular random distribution of trials
generated for each participant, but it amounted to between
19 and 25 CON-INC and CON-CON trials, and the same
number of postincongruent trials, which were evenly di-
vided between INC-INC and INC-CON trials. This proce-
dure allowed us to test recognition memory from a group
of faces presented on closely neighboring trials, but
differing specifically on the level of conflict experienced
on that trial and on the preceding trial.
Results
Familiarization phase
The familiarization phase was analyzed only to confirm that
participants were performing the orienting task properly and
to assess if the amount of time devoted to processing each
face depended on whether it was new or repeated.
Recognition responses of “sure not,” “believe not,” “believe
yes,” and “sure yes” were coded as −2, −1, 1 and 2, respec-
tively. Participants produced an average negative score of
−0.91 for the first presentation of the faces, and a positive
score of .62 for their second presentation. An ANOVA con-
ducted on these scores showed that participants’ responses
accurately discriminated between new and repeated faces,
F(1, 35) = 402.08, p < .001, ηp
2 = .92. If recognition re-
sponses were simply taken at their qualitative value, either
as “yes” or “no,” the average proportion of correct responses
amounted to .76 for the new faces and .66 for the repeated
faces. Both scores were significantly larger than those ex-
pected by chance, t(35) = 12.11, p < .001, for new faces,
and t(35) = 7.24, p < .001 for repeated faces. Responses were
also faster for repeated than for new faces (1675vs. 1860ms),
F(1, 35) = 15.91, p < .001, ηp
2 = .31. Taken together, these
results indicated that participants were aptly performing the
familiarization task.
Fig. 2 Depiction of the trial type transitions in Experiment 1. For
sequential analyses, trials are labeled as a function of congruency
transitions in the Stroop task. Capital C and capital I inside the squares
refers to congruent and incongruent trials in the Stroop task, respectively.
Both types of trials can either be followed by a congruent trial (i.e., top
label CON-CON and INC-CON) or by an incongruent trial (i.e., top label
CON-INC and INC-INC). Trials with a white background were not in-
cluded in the analyses (see the text for a more detailed description)
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Face–word Stroop task
Participants’ performance in this task was generally fast (537
ms) and accurate (.91 of correct responses). Proportion of
correct responses and response times (RTs) were submitted
to separate analyses of variance (ANOVAs), with congruency
of the current trial (congruent vs. incongruent) and congruen-
cy of the previous trial (previous congruent vs. previous in-
congruent) as within-participants factors. For the analyses of
RTs, only correct trials were included.
A Stroop effect was found both on RT and accuracy mea-
sures, as participants responded faster (517 vs. 557 ms) and
more accurately (.95 vs. .87) to congruent than to incongruent
trials, F(1, 35) = 45.57, p < .001, ηp
2 = .57, and F(1, 35) =
42.86, p = .001, ηp
2 = .55, respectively, for RT an proportion
of hits. The effect of previous congruency was also significant
for RT, showing faster responses after a congruent trial (527
vs. 547 ms), F(1, 35) = 18.39, p < .001, ηp
2 = .34, but not for
the measure of accuracy (.912 vs. .907), F < 1. Even though
the numerical pattern suggested that congruency effects were
larger after a congruent trial than after an incongruent trial
(13 ms and 1.9 points in accuracy), the Congruency ×
Previous Congruency interaction was not significant in any
of the analyses, F(1, 35) = 1.65, p = .21, ηp
2 = .05, for RT, F
< 1 for accuracy.
Recognition memory test
As shown in Fig. 3, the results indicate that participants’ rec-
ognition responses discriminated clearly between new and old
faces, but that much smaller differences were found among the
patterns observed in response to all the remaining types of
trials. In keeping with the analyses conducted by Krebs et al.
(2015), we focused on participants’ high-confidence recogni-
tion responses, as we expected to obtain an improved
proportion of such responses specifically for faces presented
under incongruent conditions. A preliminary analysis compar-
ing the average proportion of high-confidence recognition re-
sponses for the full set of old faces as compared with those
provided in response to new faces clearly showed that partic-
ipants were able to discriminate between these two types of
faces, F(1, 35) = 218.33, p < .001, ηp
2 = .86 (.55 vs. .14).
Once adequate overall memory performance was ensured,
we turned to our main analyses of interest: memory perfor-
mance as a function of current and previous trial congruency
at encoding. In contrast with Krebs et al.’s (2015) result, an
overall comparison of the proportion of high-confidence re-
sponses across all congruent and incongruent trials showed no
significant difference between them, F(1, 35) = 1.58, p = .22,
ηp
2 = .04. Participants recognized incongruent faces (.563)
slightly more frequently than incongruent faces (.540), but a
Bayesian analysis suggested that the evidence in favor of a
difference between them was merely anecdotal, BF10 = .456.
For the analysis of Previous Congruency × Current
Congruency interaction, we analyzed the proportion of high-
confident recognition responses to old faces presented either
in a congruent or in an incongruent Stroop trial, as a function
of the congruency of the preceding Stroop task. An ANOVA
with congruency and previous congruency as repeated mea-
sures showed no effect of previous congruency (F < 1), but it
showed both a significant Congruency effect (.537 vs. .577),
F(1, 35) = 4.23, p = .047, ηp
2 = .11, and a significant
Congruency × Previous Congruency interaction, F(1, 35) =
5.58, p = .024, ηp
2 =.14. This interaction showed a higher rate
of high-confident recognition responses to faces presented
under incongruent conditions selectively when they followed
another incongruent trial (.523 vs. .606), F(1, 35) = 7.37, p =
.011, ηp
2 = .17, but not when they occurred after a congruent
one (.551 vs. .548), F < 1. Bayesian paired t tests confirmed
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Fig. 3 Recognition results, showing the proportion of “sure not,”
“believe not,” “believe yes,” and “sure yes” judgments in response to
faces not previously presented (New), as compared with old faces
appearing in a congruent trial after another congruent trial (CON-CON),
in an incongruent trial after a congruent trial (CON-INC), in a congruent
trial after an incongruent trial (INC-CON), and in an incongruent trial
after another incongruent trial (INC-INC). Error bars represent the
standard error of the means
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on recognition responses after an incongruent trial, BF10 =
4.05, but not after a congruent trial, BF10 = 0.18.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 showed clear congruency effects
during the face–word Stroop task, but, unexpectedly, they
failed to show a reliable CSE. Interestingly, the recognition
task showed no evidence consistent with the hypothesis that
conflict produced a generalized enhancement of memory, for
either the conflicting trial or for those trials that come imme-
diately after conflict. As noted in the introduction, this
conflict-enhanced memory effect has been previously ob-
served in similar paradigms, but the main aim of Experiment
1 was to assess whether the up-regulation of control provoked
by an incongruent trial could lead to a better remembering of
the face presented during the conflicting trial, or of the ones
presented in the following trial. Contrary to both hypotheses,
we found significantly higher recognition scores only for
those incongruent trials that immediately followed another
incongruent trial, thus suggesting that conflict over two suc-
cessive trials might be required to trigger an effective increase
in recognition.
In hindsight, the failure to replicate the recognition
benefit found by Krebs et al.’s (2015) can be taken as less
of a surprise if we consider two empirical and conceptual
arguments. First, on purely empirical grounds, one should
notice that the behavioral effect reported by Krebs et al.
was relatively small, and it was statistically significant
only in the context of a multiple series of planned t tests
that compared the proportion of high-confident recogni-
tion responses given to a set congruent, neutral, and in-
congruent trials, without any correction for multiple com-
parisons. Second, on more conceptual grounds, one must
take into account that recognition memory performance in
this procedure can be driven not only by encoding those
faces during the face–word Stroop task but also by pro-
cessing of the same faces during the previous familiariza-
tion task. Note that Krebs et al.’s (2015) design and ours
include a new set of faces as lures for the recognition
memory phase, and thus it is impossible to disentangle
effects of the two encoding phases. Moreover, if a
conflict-driven enhancement is indeed taking place but is
weak in nature, it is therefore possible that a single pre-
sentation of the faces in congruent or incongruent condi-
tions is not enough to override the effects of the familiar-
ization task. In Experiment 2, we introduced two main
changes intended to increase the impact of conflict on
the measures of memory: first, we made the conflict ma-
nipulation stronger, by presenting the faces repeatedly un-
der congruent or incongruent conditions, and, second, we
made the memory task dependent exclusively on the ex-
periences gathered within the conflict task.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 aimed at further exploring the puzzling
result of Experiment 1 by testing whether repeated ex-
posure of faces under congruent or incongruent condi-
tions could produce differences in remembering by vir-
tue of triggering an additive encoding boost. To achieve
this main goal, we used the same core paradigm of
Experiment 1, with the following changes: First, during
the Stroop task, we repeatedly presented the faces under
conditions of either high or low conflict, to reinforce any
possible effect of conflict-enhanced memory produced
by a single presentation. In order to strengthen any con-
gruency effect, we also moved the presentation of the
distracter word earlier in time (Appelbaum, 2009).
Second, only a subset of familiarized faces was passed
along to the Stroop task, and the remaining ones were
used as lures in the memory test; we therefore changed
from a pure recognition memory task to a source mem-
ory task (Konopka & Benjamin, 2009). On doing so, we
achieved the dual goal of avoiding any functional ceiling
effect that could have been reached if participants were
presented with a simple recognition task after having
experienced multiple exposures to a reduced group of
faces, and making recognition performance depend ex-
clusively on the experience accumulated in the condi-
tions of high versus low conflict.
Finally, to ensure that our manipulation effectively affected
the amount of control exerted on each trial, we included a
cognitive control manipulation that has been shown to modu-
late the degree of control at the item level. Instead of repeating
some faces exclusively under incongruent conditions and
others only under congruent conditions, we manipulated the
proportion of congruency in three probabilistic levels for dif-
ferent items and assessed whether the items that appeared
most frequently under incongruent conditions produced (1)
smaller congruency effects in the Stroop trials and (2) higher
levels of recognition in the memory test, as compared with
those presented most frequently under congruent conditions.
Method
Participants
Twenty-seven students from the Universidad de Santiago de
Compostela signed informed consents and took part in the
experiment in exchange for course credit.
Stimuli
The face stimuli were selected out of the same sample of
180 faces from the Glasgow Unfamiliar Face Database
(Burton et al., 2010). In this experiment, the dimensions
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of the face pictures and the overlaid words were reduced
with respect to those used in Experiment 1 (3 × 4 cm
approximately for the faces, and 2.6 × 0.5 cm for the
irrelevant words), and the pictures representing the re-
sponse buttons appeared above instead of below the faces.
Procedure
The structure of Experiment 2 mimicked that of
Experiment 1, with the following changes. The familiari-
zation phase included two repetitions of only 50 faces, for
a total of 100 trials. The faces were chosen at random for
each participant, with the constraint that 25 of them
corresponded to male faces and the remaining 25
corresponded to female faces. From these 50 familiarized
faces, 15 male and 15 female faces were selected to be
used in the face–word Stroop task, whereas the remaining
20 faces were reserved as lures for the recognition task.
The face–word Stroop task was composed of two blocks
of 120 trials, each presenting four repetitions of the 30
selected faces. These faces were further subdivided in
three groups, each containing five male and five female
faces, which were assigned respectively to conditions of
high proportion of congruency (75/25), balanced congru-
ency (50/50), and low proportion of congruency (25/75).
Thus, each face from the face–word Stroop task was pre-
sented four times per block for a total of eight presenta-
tions. Ten of these faces were presented in a balanced
proportion (i.e., they occurred four times in either congru-
ent and incongruent trials), another 10 faces were present-
ed mostly in congruent trials (six congruent vs. two in-
congruent presentations), and a final group of 10 faces
were presented in mostly incongruent trials (two congru-
ent and six incongruent trials). Therefore, although the
overall proportion of congruency over the whole experi-
ment was kept constant, a third of the trials belonged to
“mostly incongruent” items, another third to “mostly con-
gruent” items, and the final third to a balanced, control
group.
On each Stroop trial, the trial started with an 800-ms
fixation point. This was replaced by the distracter word
(i.e., the Spanish word for MAN or WOMAN), which
remained on the screen for 200 ms, and it was then re-
placed by the combination of the target face plus the same
superimposed word. This remained on the screen for an-
other 1000 ms, regardless of participants’ response. As in
Experiment 1, participants responded using the keys “Z”
and “M,” with the mapping between gender and responses
counterbalanced across participants. Participants received
visual feedback of their response, but the faces remained
on the screen until the end of the trial. They also received
a warning sound whenever they committed an error.
After the Stroop task, participants performed another
distracter task,2 and then they were presented with the surprise
recognition task. In this task, participants were presented with
the full series of 50 faces presented during the familiarization
task and were instructed to recognize which of them had been
also presented during the gender discrimination task, using the
same four categories of responses to represent their relative
confidence in their response. Note that in this version of the
memory test, a “new” correct response would imply a face not
presented in the Stroop task, although all of the faces where
included in the familiarization task.
Results
Familiarization task
As in Experiment 1, we confirmed that participants were
performing the orienting task and assessed the amount of time
devoted to processing each face depending on whether it was
presented for the first or for the second time. The average
score for the first presentations of the faces was of −1.29,
while the score for the second presentation was 1.02, F(1,
26) = 576.88, p < .001, ηp
2 = .96. The average proportion of
qualitatively correct (i.e., yes or no) recognition responses
amounted to .84 and .73, respectively, for new and repeated
faces, both of them being significantly larger than those ex-
pected by chance, t(26) = 17.38, p < .001, for new faces, and
t(26) = 12.53, p < .001, for repeated faces. Responses were
also faster for repeated than for new faces (2729 vs. 2406 ms),
F(1, 26) = 4.91, p = .04, ηp
2 = .15. Thus, participants were able
to perform the familiarization task according to what could be
expected.
Face–word Stroop task
Participants’ performance in this task was fast (544 ms) and
accurate (.94 of correct responses). Accuracy (proportion of
correct responses) and RTs were submitted to separate
ANOVAs with congruency of the current trial (congruent vs.
incongruent), congruency of the previous trial (previous con-
gruent vs. previous incongruent), and item type (mostly con-
gruent, balanced, and mostly incongruent) as within-
participants factors. For the analyses of RT, only correct trials
were included.
2 Distracter tasks in Experiment 2 consisted of a serial-reaction task. The task
was distributed in two parts, one presented between the familiarization and the
Stroop task, and another between the Stroop task and the recognition task.
Specifically, participants were trained with a probabilistic serial-reaction-
time task during the first delay interval, and were retrained with another block
of the same task, and performed a generation task over the second delay
interval. The intervals were variable depending on participants’ individual
performance, but they took between 10 and 15 min on average.
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A Stroop effect was found both on RT and accuracy mea-
sures, as participants responded faster (528 vs. 569 ms) and
more accurately (.96 vs. .925) to congruent than to incongru-
ent trials, F(1, 26) = 120.53, p < .001, ηp
2 = .82, and F (1, 26)
= 14.11, p = .001, ηp
2 = .35, respectively. The effect of previ-
ous congruency was also significant for RT (543 vs. 554 ms),
F(1, 26) = 8.49, p = .007, ηp
2 = .25, but not for the measure of
accuracy (.942 vs. .943),F < 1. Themain effect of type of item
was not significant for either RT or accuracy (Fs < 1).
Interestingly, there were two interactions that reached signifi-
cant levels in the analysis of RT: The Congruency × Previous
Congruency interaction, F(1, 26) = 18. 93, p < .001, ηp
2 = .42,
revealed that congruency effects were larger after a congruent
trial than after an incongruent trial (55 vs. 27 ms). Although
this effect was not significant in the analysis of accuracy, F(1,
26) = 3.18, p = .09, ηp
2 = .11, the pattern also indicated that the
numerical difference in accuracy was larger after a congruent
than after an incongruent trial (4.6 vs. 2.5 points), thus
confirming that the effect observed in RTs was not the result
of a speed–accuracy trade-off. Most importantly, the
Congruency × Item Type interaction was also significant,
F(2, 52) = 9.89, p = .001, ηp
2 = .28, indicating that the con-
gruency effect observed for balanced items (39 ms, p < .001)
grew larger for mostly congruent items (62 ms, p < .001) and
decreased for mostly incongruent items (21 ms, p = .004).
Bonferroni-corrected comparisons indicated that these differ-
ences were largely due to faster responding to the incongruent
trials in the mostly incongruent condition, as compared with
the balanced andmostly congruent conditions (15 ms, p = .02,
and 20 ms, p = .006, respectively), as well as to an improved
responding to congruent trials under mostly congruent condi-
tions, when compared with balanced (17 ms, p = .029), but not
to mostly incongruent conditions (21 ms, p = .10). In sum, the
results were consistent with the claim that the item type ma-
nipulation did effectively modulate the amount of control
exerted in response to each face. Although this interaction
was nonsignificant in the analysis of accuracy (F < 1), the
qualitative pattern pointed to the same trend to show larger
effects of congruency for those items that were presentedmore
often under congruent conditions (4.6) than for those present-
ed in either balanced or mostly incongruent conditions (3.2
and 2.8 points, respectively; see Fig. 4).
Recognition
As shown in Fig. 5, the results indicated that participants’
recognition responses discriminated clearly between those
faces that were presented repeatedly in the Stroop task and
those that had been seen only in the familiarization phase,
but that smaller differences were found among the patterns
observed in response to all remaining types of trials. An anal-
ysis comparing the average proportion of high-confidence
recognition responses to all faces presented in the Stroop task
as compared with those exclusively seen in the familiarization
phase clearly showed that participants were able to perform
this source memory task, F(1, 26) = 182.32, p < .001, ηp
2 =
.88 (.64 vs. .14). However, a comparison of the proportion of
high-confidence recognition responses provided to those faces
that appeared in the Stroop task, in terms of the relative fre-
quency with which they were presented under congruent or
incongruent conditions, indicated that participants’ responses
did not discriminate among these three conditions, F(2, 52) =
1.05, p = .36, ηp
2 = .04. Participants recognized those faces
presented more often on incongruent trials slightly better than
those presented most frequently on congruent trials (.667 vs.
.633), but this difference was far from significant, t(26) = 0.84,
p = .41. A Bayesian t test provided a Bayes factor of B10 = .28.
In order to gather a potentially more sensitive measure of
recognition to compare the three types of old faces, we
adopted the scoring procedure described for the familiariza-
tion task, assigning scores of −2, −1, 1, and 2, respectively, to
the responses “sure new,” “believe new,” “believe old,” and
“sure old,” and we conducted an analysis of the effect of the
amount of conflict on the average recognition scores obtained
for each of the three types of old faces. The average scores
corresponding respectively to mostly congruent, balanced,
and mostly incongruent trials amounted respectively to 1.13,
1.10, and 1.18. A one-way ANOVA conducted on these scores
did not produce a significant effect of type of face, F(2, 52) =
0.31, p = .73, ηp
2 = .01, and a Bayesian repeated-measures
analysis produced a BF01 = 7.29, suggesting that the results
were 7 times more compatible with the null hypothesis than
with the existence of a genuine difference among the levels of
recognition of these three types of faces. In other words, the
results reinforced the conclusion that the conflict manipulation
during encoding did not produce a differential recognition
memory effect.
Discussion
The results of this experiment showed a clear ISPCE, suggest-
ing that participants are sensitive to the congruency context in
which they have encountered a relatively long series of previ-
ously seen faces. The results showed that, even though partic-
ipants responded faster to congruent than to incongruent trials,
this difference was modulated by the previous experience with
those faces, so that they responded faster to each specific face
in the congruence condition in which it had been most fre-
quently encountered. Reduction in RTspecific for each face in
its most frequent condition necessarily entails some form of
learning (or of long-term priming) that should be responsible
for the facilitation obtained when participants have to respond
again to a particular combination of a face and an amount of
conflict. However, the fact that participants improved their
way of dealing with the particular congruency conditions as-
sociated with a face does not appear to rely on a better
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encoding of the face identity; in other words, the ISPCE effect
was obtained in conditions that did not produce any differen-
tial effect in recognition performance. Indeed, the results of
this experiment clearly indicate that increasing the amount of
control needed to process a given face by exposing it repeat-
edly in conditions of high conflict does not result in larger
recognition scores than those obtained by exposing partici-
pants to those faces in conditions of lower conflict. Plainly,
then, the results are inconsistent with the claim that processing
stimuli in conditions of high conflict should lead to later en-
hanced memory performance.
General discussion
The conflict-driven memory enhancement hypothesis predicts
that under circumstances of increased control, strong encoding
of the processed information takes place. By having to active-
ly boost processing of the relevant features of the stimuli (or
by suppressing the irrelevant ones), attended information gets
stored in such a way that it would bemore easily accessed later
on. The exact mechanism by which this “strong encoding”
would act is still unknown. In this study we made use a
face–word Stroop task to further explore the nature of this
process. In two experiments, we manipulated the congruency
between the gender of a face and a superimposed word. This
manipulation being done at different levels allowed us not
only to measure standard congruency effects block-wise but
also to explore other manifestations of cognitive control, such
as CSE and ISPCE.
In spite of obtaining reliable immediate effects (i.e., RTand
accuracy) of face–word congruency, those effects did not gen-
erally transfer to memory performance. First of all, in the two
experiments presented here, congruency measured during the
current trial did not translate to better recognition scores for
incongruent items. Second, in Experiment 1, congruency of
the previous trial, which typically affects performance during
the Stroop task, did not generally improve memory for all
trials that followed an incongruent trial, even though we found
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Fig. 5 Source memory results, showing the proportion of “sure not,”
“believe not,” “believe yes,” and “sure yes” judgments in response to
faces not presented in the Stroop task (not-Stroop), as compared with
faces presented mostly on congruent trials (Mostly CON), equally on
congruent and incongruent trials (Balanced), and mostly on incongruent
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Proportion of correct responses
Fig. 4 Reaction times (left panel) and proportion of correct responses
(right panel) obtained in response to faces presented under congruent
(con) and incongruent (inc) conditions, represented separately for those
faces that appeared with the same frequency in each of these conditions
(balanced), and for those that appear more often under either congruent or
incongruent conditions. Error bars represent the standard errors of the
means
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incongruent trials might have produced an effect in the expect-
ed direction. Lastly, and perhaps more interestingly, manipu-
lations of congruency at the item level, which undoubtedly
imply learning about specific items, still did not affect our
participants’ ability to recognize old items in any differential
way. The absence of statistically significant differences when
using null hypothesis significance testing, together with the
use of Bayesian statistics to assess the likelihood of a null
result in the presence of a true effect, greatly supports the
claim that conflict at encoding does not directly lead to a better
encoding of the target information (see Muhmenthaler &
Meier, 2019; Ortiz-Tudela et al., 2016; Ortiz-Tudela et al.,
2018; Ptok, Thomson, Humphreys, & Watter, 2019, for sim-
ilar findings).
Several accounts of cognitive control depict LWPCE and
CSE as a reinstatement of a previous response set linked with
specific stimulus features. It can be very appealing to equate
this reinstatement to a “memory enhancement.” However,
caution is needed when making such claims. First, the dynam-
ic interactions between cognitive control and learning process-
es are certainly a central aspect of human cognition, and cog-
nitive control can be differentially applied as a function of past
experience (Blais et al., 2007; Crump et al., 2006; Gratton
et al., 1992; Jacoby et al., 2003; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008).
However, the mechanisms that give rise to the response on a
memory test, such as recognition, could very well be indepen-
dent of these dynamics. Second, the assumption that height-
ened attention to relevant information in conflicting situations
leads to better encoding of the attended information is very
likely to be missing a key point: During (and after) conflicting
situations amyriad of cognitive processes need to take place in
order to overcome the interference. Some of these processes
are likely to be harmful for memory encoding (e.g., directing
attention towards the response set rather than to the stimulus
itself), whereas others can indeed be beneficial (e.g., longer
processing time). This mixed combination of processes could
be responsible for the seemingly inconsistent pattern of results
found in the literature. Of particular relevance here are
postresponse processes such as performance monitoring or
stimulus reelaboration that could be less important on congru-
ent situations in which fluency in processing is predominant.
The two experiments reported in the present manuscript
plus a substantial portion of the reviewed evidence supports
the absence of a benefit for memory when a conflict is pre-
sented at encoding (by either measuring no differences or by
actually finding the opposite). However, this set of results
seems to be at odds with another substantial group of studies
that was indeed able to measure a conflict-driven boost in
memory performance (Krebs et al., 2015; Rosner et al.,
2015b). However, this contradiction might not be such when
examined carefully. In addition to subtle differences between
the conflict tasks and the memory tests used in each of these
studies, which could be responsible for the mixed pattern of
results, we should also point out that most of the increased
sensitivity showed for incongruent trials in the paradigm used
by Rosner and colleagues occurred for false-alarm rates and
not for hit rates (Davis et al., 2019, but see Rosner et al.,
2015a, Experiment 2). In other words, rather than showing
increased recognition of those ensembles shown under incon-
gruent conditions, their results mostly showed that partici-
pants tended to falsely judge as old many of the new displays
that were presented under congruent conditions. Because this
could be explained by the increased processing fluency
afforded by congruent ensembles, it will be worth examining
whether these differences also arise systematically in hit rates.
Finally, it is worth noting that, although our experimental
design is close to that of Krebs et al. (2015), some minor
differences between the two studies prevent ours to be an
exact replication; however, testing an exact replication was
far from our intention. Indeed, the use of fMRI in the study
by Krebs et al. (2015), in which they measured higher recog-
nition performance for incongruent trials, enforces a slow task
pace in which the intertrial interval (ITI) ranged from 1 to 7 s.
Because this timing would be strange and inefficient for a
behavioral experiment, and the entire context of an fMRI ex-
periment includes many more factors that are impossible to
recreate in a behavioral set up, we decided to opt for a con-
ceptual replication. By staying close to their design in terms of
the type of stimuli and type of conflict used, but using much
more standard timing and experimental conditions for behav-
ioral paradigms, we believe that the conclusions of our study
can be more generalizable and thus more easily linked to other
work with somewhat similar paradigms and goals.
It is, of course, possible that the differences between
Krebs et al.’s (2015) results and ours (namely, the pres-
ence vs. absence of the conflict-driven memory effects)
critically rely on the slow and variable pace of their study,
but this would also point to the real breadth and scope of
their results. More plausibly, perhaps, although still overt-
ly speculative, one might adduce that the differences be-
tween Krebs et al.’s and our results might rely on the
different procedures used to select the specific trials that
were tested in the recognition task. Krebs et al. selected
their recognition trials completely at chance, and therefore
it was likely that their sample contained a comparable
number of incongruent trials presented at encoding after
another incongruent trial (i.e., INC-INC transition trials)
than of trials in which the incongruent trial was presented
after a congruent trial (i.e., CON-INC trials). In contrast,
our selection procedure took as reference the incongruent
trials that appeared after two congruent trials, and then
selected their neighbors for comparison purposes. As a
consequence, our incongruent test trials would include
roughly a half of trials encoded in an INC-INC transition
than trials encoded in the context of a CON-INC transi-
tion. If a memory improvement was driven by responding
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to several incongruent trials in a row, this effect could
explain why Krebs et al. found an overall improvement
for their incongruent trials, and why we failed to repro-
duce the same effect. Interestingly, in Experiment 1, mem-
ory for INC-INC trials was enhanced with respect to all
other conditions. This was not a result that we expected,
and therefore we must be cautious in offering a possible
explanation for it. In principle, one might speculate that
this pattern could point to the existence of a genuine ef-
fect of increased control in memory, but an effect that
would be too small or inconsistent after a single incon-
gruent trial to be reliably measured. As a consequence,
one would need an uninterrupted series of control de-
manding trials to produce an up-regulation of cognitive
control that would in turn change memory storage. This
could explain why a test that assesses recognition from a
random sample of faces could have found significant ef-
fects that our procedure was not able to replicate. A ran-
dom selection of the faces presented over the Stroop task
could have sampled a good number of faces that occurred
in a context of two, three, or more previous incongruent
trials; in contrast, our selection criteria tested only those
faces that occurred on incongruent trials that came after
two congruent trials in a row, and the trials that preceded
and followed these referential trials. Perhaps the use of
such strict criteria might have prevented cumulative ef-
fects from playing a role in our design. This so-far purely
speculative hypothesis would need to be empirically pur-
sued in future studies, perhaps manipulating the runs of
congruent and incongruent trials, and measuring the
impact of that manipulation in recognition performance.
In any case, the fact that in Experiment 2 we did not find
better memory for faces presented up to six times under
incongruent conditions at least indicates that a single
conflicting trial does not improve memory in a small
and nonsignificant way that could be made significant
by accumulating the impact of several encounters. In
sum, the results of the present study are more consistent
with the conclusion that one would need to accumulate a
sufficient amount of conflict, by means of a series of
incongruent trials, to produce an upsurge in memory
storage.
Future research will probably need to take into account
many other differences in experimental paradigms to fully
explain this mixed pattern of results, and to clarify the mech-
anisms underlying these effects. Classic accounts of memory
formation, such as the levels of processing framework (Craik
& Lockhart, 1972) or the desirable difficulty hypothesis
(Bjork & Bjork, 1992) could accommodate these conflict-
driven boosts in memory performance. However, these theo-
ries lack a satisfying mechanistic explanation of the effect.
Moreover, asymmetric effects without a clear intermediate/
neutral condition that could be used as baseline can be equally
interpreted as benefits or costs with very different implications
for their underlying mechanisms.
Conclusion
One could argue that the set of results presented here raises
more questions than it provides definitive answers for (as it is
often the case with null results). However, we firmly believe
that what we have presented here is a direct test of a highly
relevant and currently debated hypothesis. If the exertion of
cognitive control necessarily triggers enhanced memory
encoding of the processed information, its effect ought to be
measurable following its most common manifestations. In the
present study we have shown three different ways (i.e., current
congruency, previous congruency, and item-specific propor-
tion congruency) in which applying cognitive control im-
proves performance in an immediate and time-restricted de-
layed way, but that do not render long-lasting effects in mem-
ory. Even in the conditions in which we can reliably measure
that a specific enhanced control mode was learned and applied
for specific items, this enhanced control was not directly trans-
lated to better encoding of identity of the item.
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